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AGDA (M) (1 Sep 70)

FOR OT UT 70B032

8 September 1970

**SUBJECT:** Senior Officer Debriefing Report: BG Henry J. Muller Jr., Deputy  
Senior Advisor, I Corps Tactical Zone, Period 12 Sep 69 to 15 Jun  
70 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 1-26, subject, Senior Officer Debriefing Program (U) dated 4 November 1966.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of BG Henry J. Muller Jr., subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 1-26; however, it should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.
4. Information of actions initiated under provisions of AR 1-26, as a result of subject report should be provided ACSFOR OT UT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM**  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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AVHGC-DST

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report - BG Henry J. Muller, Jr.

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D. C. 20310

1. Reference para 6, AR 1-26.
2. Attached are three copies of the Senior Officer Debriefing Report prepared by BG Henry J. Muller, Jr.. The report covers the period 12 September 1969 - 15 June 1970, during which time BG Muller served as Deputy Senior Advisor, I Corps Tactical Zone.
3. BG Muller is recommended as a candidate guest speaker at appropriate service schools and joint colleges.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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as(trip)  
2 cy w/d HQ DA

A handwritten signature, likely of the Commander, is written in ink over the typed text "FOR THE COMMANDER:". The signature is cursive and appears to read "C. H. Muller".

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HEADQUARTERS US ARMY ADVISORY GROUP  
I, CORPS TACTICAL ZONE  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96349



MACCZ-ICG

9 June 1970

SUBJECT: Debriefing Report

Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96375

Inclosed are five copies of my Debriefing Report in compliance with  
AR 1-26 and USARV Regulation 1-3.

HENRY J. MULLER, JR.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

cc: CG XXIV Corps

1. R 374T  
1. 632  
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HEADQUARTERS US ARMY ADVISORY GROUP  
I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96340



9 June 1970

DEBRIEFING REPORT  
DEPUTY SENIOR ADVISOR, I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE

(U) 1. INTRODUCTION - This report is submitted in compliance with AR 1-26 and USARV Regulation 1-3, Senior Officer Debriefing Program. It will cover my assessment of the progress in the improvement and modernization of ARVN units in the I Corps Tactical Zone and an appraisal of their capability to assume an increasing share of the combat operations in this CTZ concomitant with a withdrawal of US forces under the 'Vietnamization' program. This evaluation is based on my experience as the Deputy Senior Advisor from 12 September 1969 until 15 June 1970.

(C) 2. ORGANIZATION - The I Corps Tactical Zone includes the five northern provinces of the Republic of Vietnam. The Corps Headquarters is in Danang approximately midway between the DMZ on the north and the southern boundary of Quang Ngai Province. A sketch map of the CTZ with locations of principal units is at Inclosure 1.

The major tactical elements are the 1st and 2nd Divisions, the Quang Da Special Zone, the 1st Armored Brigade and the 1st Ranger Group. Combat support elements of the Corps include the Corps Artillery, 8th Engineer Construction Group and the I Corps Signal Battalion. An organization chart is at Inclosure 2.

The 1st Infantry Division in the northern two provinces is a heavy division with 17 infantry battalions (one of the four regiments has five organic battalions), and two armored cavalry squadrons. This division is collocated with the areas of operations of the US 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) and the separate 1st Brigade of the 5th US Mechanized Division.

The 2nd Division in the southern two provinces is a standard division of 12 infantry battalions in three regiments with one armored cavalry squadron. It is collocated with the Americal Division and each of its regiments is assigned a joint area of operations with one of the three brigades of the Americal Division.

In the center province of Quang Nam, the Quang Da Special Zone Headquarters is responsible for all tactical operations in the province plus the security of the city of Danang. The only unit permanently assigned to the Quang Da Special Zone (QDSZ) at this time is the 51st Infantry Regiment with its support artillery. Corps tactical units in the province include the 1st Ranger Group with three ranger battalions and the 17th Armored Cavalry Squadron. These units come under the operational control of the QDSZ as required for specific operations.

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An additional corps unit in Quang Nam is the 1st Armored Brigade Headquarters, a comparatively new command which became operational in September 1969. This is a mobile tactical headquarters intended to provide command and control for either an armored task force or a combined force of armored and infantry units. Its normal attachments are the 11th and 17th Armored Cavalry Squadrons, however the 11th Squadron has been attached to the 1st Division in the north during the past year.

(S) 3. GENERAL ASSESSMENT - The progress in the improvement and modernization of the ARVN units in the I CTZ during the past year has been impressive and the prospects for continuing improvement in combat proficiency and increased self-sufficiency are very encouraging. All major tactical units in I Corps are considered to be combat proficient not just as compared to other ARVN units in Vietnam but by absolute military standards; there are no "problem units" at this time. The 2d Battalion of the 54th Regiment and the 2d Battalion of the 5th Regiment have recently suffered heavy casualties in operations against NVA forces on Tan Tavern Fire Support Base and near Hien Duc respectively. It will take time to rebuild the strength of these battalions but this can be accomplished through the established personnel replacement system.

Activation and operational readiness dates of new units authorized under the current phase of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program have been reasonably on schedule and their initial operational performance has been at least satisfactory.

The effective leadership and positive attitude toward "Vietnamization" on the part of the Corps Commander, LTC Lam, and his two division commanders, MG Truong and BG Toan, have been outstanding. Leadership at the regimental level is excellent. Battalion commanders vary from good to excellent. If reinforcing units are made available from the ARVN General Reserve to assist the 1st Division in countering the periodic buildup of NVA regiments entering this area from across the DMZ and from the Laotian frontier and, if the combat and combat service support now provided I Corps tactical elements by a combination of ARVN and US units continues at the same level, there is every reason to believe that the objective of "Vietnamization" can be achieved.

(S) 4. PERSONNEL - Despite a continuing high turnover of personnel from casualties and desertion, and an increase in authorization while the assigned strength remained relatively stable, I Corps still maintains an effective strength level. During the six month period ending 15 May, the assigned strength rose by approximately 1,574 men while the authorized strength increased 2,579, giving I Corps 89% of fill. A table showing current unit strengths is at Inclosure 3.

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Desertions continue to be a serious drain on resources during 1970 with an average monthly rate of 23.6 per thousand, a slight increase from 21.6, the average rate for 1969. In an effort to counteract the continuing desertion problem, the Corps Commander approved and dispatched to the field two surveys devised by the Corps G1 and G1 Advisor. It is hoped this survey, the Morale Evaluation and Assessment Program (MEAP), will aid in identifying the many problems involved in morale and desertion. Translated copies of the Unit and Individual Surveys are at Inclosures 4 and 5.

Although the leadership is evaluated as good to excellent at the battalion level, there is a significant shortage of authorized grades and corresponding experience at the battalion level and below. Current manning reflects shortages of 50%, 51%, and 62%, respectively in the grades of lieutenant colonel, major, and captain.

Personnel services and administration are improving but procedures are still hampered by a slow bureaucratic system reluctant to delegate authority.

(S) 5. TRAINING - During the past year 13 of the 36 infantry battalions received one month of refresher training as a unit. This progressive squad, platoon, company and battalion training has been accomplished by ARVN with minimum advisor assistance.

Particular emphasis has been placed on joint operations with US tactical units, common areas of operations, collocated command posts and close association between the battalion and brigade commanders of the 101st and Americal Divisions and their Vietnamese counterparts. The brigade commanders particularly have assisted the ARVN regimental commanders by demonstration and by example. Responsive combat and combat service support was provided when the ARVN commander required it. This has promoted aggressiveness and self-confidence as well as assisted the training of ARVN forces in the procedures and techniques of employing supporting firepower and air mobility. The proposed collocation of ARVN units of the Quang Da Special Zone and the regiments of the 1st Marine Division should produce comparable results. It is my opinion that the remarkable progress of the 1st and 2nd Divisions in I Corps can be attributed primarily to this close association with US tactical elements in their common operational areas. This is not to argue that combined operations and collocated areas of operations and command posts should be continued indefinitely. As ARVN units attain the optimum benefits of close tactical association with US elements, it is our policy to encourage increasing independence.

## (C) 6. SPECIALIZED TRAINING -

a. Sensors. I Corps' progress in the sensor program (Tight Jaw) since its institution in July 1969 has been very satisfactory with no major problems encountered. In August 1969 units in I Corps completed their initial training and the sensor devices were first emplaced in September.

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During the period from October to December 1969 the number of sensors utilized in I Corps more than doubled, and then doubled again between December and the end of January 1970. ARVN is currently employing a total of 307 Magnetic, seismic and infra-red sensors in 85 strings throughout the Corps.

Since the program began, sensor training, both formal and informal, has continued with assistance from mobile training teams, advisory personnel and US counterpart divisions. To date over 250 ARVN and 35 advisory personnel have received training in the technical aspects of sensor employment. These figures are indicative of the I Corps investment in the program.

Excavation has begun for the installation of 2,000 meters of the Balanced Pressure Anti-Intrusion System around Camp Carroll to bolster the defenses of this critical base near the DMZ. Training for this project has already been completed. Training will commence shortly in preparation for the installation of 3,000 meters of the same system around Hill 55, the Command Post of the 51st Regiment in Quang Da Special Zone.

The major I Corps units have dummy Air Delivered Seismic Intrusion Detectors (ADSID) on hand and will begin training in the employment of these devices in the near future. Both divisions also have acoustic sensors available for employment.

The employment of these two devices, new to ARVN, should further improve the overall program in both target acquisition and intelligence collection.

h. Air Reconnaissance. Vietnamization of the request system for aerial reconnaissance began in October 1969 with a 60-day training period for the G2 Air Sections at Corps, Division and Special Zone headquarters. Since October of last year ARVN's daily reconnaissance requests have improved in both quantity and quality. I Corps has become an active participant in the monthly air reconnaissance planning by assuming the majority of the responsibility for the overall coverage of the I Corps area of operations. The monthly reconnaissance plan is now prepared entirely by Vietnamese personnel and only augmented by requests from US units. Over 5,000 photo, infra-red and visual reconnaissance requests have been submitted by I Corps units since October 1969, and they continue to utilize SLAR and "Sniffer" in their overall, day-to-day application of air reconnaissance assets.

Training of air reconnaissance personnel has been conducted on an uninterrupted basis beginning in October 1969. In addition to training 55 ARVN observers in hand-held camera techniques, further expansion of the air reconnaissance program was initiated during March - April 1970. During that period 20 students were trained in the highly specialized skill of

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photo interpreting, reproduction and related activities. The purpose of this training was to prepare ARVN for the assumption of the responsibility for aerial reconnaissance through all stages: requesting, processing, interpreting the completed missions and disseminating the results.

To further perfect the newly acquired skills of these 20 students, they were integrated into the Detachment B of the Military Intelligence Battalion Reconnaissance Support (MIBARS) located in the I Corps Headquarters compound.

c. Long Range Reconnaissance Patrols. A program to increase the use of long range reconnaissance patrols was initiated in February 1970 with the objective of aiding ARVN in the attainment of complete self-sufficiency in this essential means of intelligence collection.

Prior to February 1970, I Corps made little use of long range reconnaissance patrols, particularly in the western areas of the Corps. There are two primary reasons for the lack of employment in the west: (1) ARVN does not have sufficient organic assets, particularly helicopters, to conduct reconnaissance operations along the western border; (2) responsibility for reconnaissance in the western portions of the Corps had previously been assigned to the US forces in I Corps.

Neither a set organization nor a training program had been established in the reconnaissance units. To overcome these deficiencies sixty long range reconnaissance teams of five men each were formed from the reconnaissance units organic to each division and regiment, and a program which provides for three types of training was established. This training program encompasses: (1) reconnaissance instruction given by each major ARVN unit to its own personnel; (2) arrangements for a US division to conduct training for its ARVN counterpart unit; (3) the training of ARVN personnel at the Recondo School in Nha Trang.

Although progress in expanding I Corps's long range reconnaissance patrol capability has been made and some units are conducting their own patrols, unilateral operations in all I Corps units are not possible as the state of training and expertise varies from good to poor throughout the Corps. To compensate for this difference, combined (US - ARVN) teams have been formed and are currently being employed. It is envisioned that these combined operations will continue until all I Corps units have acquired the necessary competence for the conduct of their own patrols. Current plans also call for the training of 144 ARVN personnel at the Recondo School by 19 December 1970. The objective of this training is to provide each reconnaissance unit in the I Corps Tactical Zone with a nucleus of nine specially trained personnel. To date, 18 personnel of I Corps have successfully completed the course of instruction.

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The success of the expansion of the I Corps' ground reconnaissance activities is reflected by the fact that since April 1970 a total of 38 long range reconnaissance patrols have been employed for an average of four days each.

With continued assistance from US forces, primarily in air assets and training, it is expected that ARVN will acquire the competence necessary to assume responsibility for the long range ground reconnaissance mission as US forces are withdrawn.

d. Arc Light Nominations. During the past year there has been an especial emphasis in preparing corps and division staffs in the techniques of preparing and processing nominations for Arc Light (B-52) strikes. The fact that over one-half of the ARVN nominations have been approved gives evidence to the thoroughness of their target intelligence data bases as well as their ability in preparing the rather detailed and complex nominations.

From October through December 1969 only 23 nominations were submitted by I Corps units. One hundred targets were submitted during the period January through May 1970. Of these 32 have been struck and the remaining 68 are still valid.

e. Air Assault Training for VNAF Helicopter Squadron. The 213th Helicopter Squadron is the only VNAF UH-1 squadron in I CTZ. Another squadron, the 233rd is programmed to be activated 1 January 1971. The 213th at present has 31 aircraft assigned. Two helicopters are configured as C&C aircraft. Eight aircraft are to be converted to gunships. These eight aircraft are presently waiting gun shipments from CONUS. The gunships are expected to be ready, to include gunnery training for the crews by 11 July 1970. The 213th during April flew 21% of their authorized flying program in combat assaults (CAs). This participation in CAs was disrupted by a combination of constraints, some self imposed, and the requirement to send five aircraft and six crews to participate in the Cambodian counteroffensive. The 213th does have a mission capability but it is operating below its potential. Additional comments on the 213th are included under the category of helicopter support.

(C) 7. SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE - The introduction and replacement of equipment under the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program is satisfactory. There are no significant shortages of mission essential items.

While the responsiveness and sense of urgency in the logistical systems have not yet attained the desired standards, the logistical system is adequate in terms of organization, procedures and capability. At no time in the past year has a tactical operation been cancelled or materially restricted for lack of logistical support.

Continued and increasing command emphasis has developed an adequate and improving unit maintenance program.

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(C) 8. LOGISTICS - Progress toward self-sufficiency in the 1st Area Logistics Command has been excellent. Activation of additional technical service supply, maintenance and transportation units has kept pace with increases in supported strengths. Concurrent activation of technical service command and control headquarters, e.g., 110th OM Group, 1st Transportation Truck Group, 51st Ordnance Ammunition Group, provided necessary coordination and direction of effort while reducing the span of control by the Logistics Command headquarters to manageable levels.

New units were cadred by existing units. The resulting shortage in both old and new units, of strength and skill level, is being made up by extensive recruiting and training programs. Some new facilities have been established. However, additional construction is required to maintain pace with increased work load. This construction is programmed, but as more US facilities are released to ARVN this problem may be solved with little or no added construction. Distribution capabilities are excellent.

Third and fourth echelon maintenance varies from fair in engineer to excellent in signal and ordnance.

(S) 9. ORGANIZATION - The span of control question in the 1st ARVN Division with 19 maneuver battalions and its extensive area of operations has been effectively answered by the deployment of the 1st Division Forward CP to the Dong Ha Combat Base. The Forward CP controls the three regimental equivalent headquarters deployed along the DMZ and in the coastal lowlands in Quang Tri Province. The 2nd Regiment, the 7th Cavalry Squadron with one or two infantry battalions attached and the 11th Cavalry with one infantry battalion attached are normally controlled by the Forward CP. At the present time the 54th Regiment (-) is conducting operations against the NVA in western Quang Tri under the operational control of the Forward CP. This somewhat overloads the forward command post but is only a temporary arrangement.

The 2nd ARVN Division is a standard division with normal support. There are no particular organizational problems.

The organizational inadequacies of the Quang Da Special Zone have, to a great extent, been corrected by the recent JGS approval of a TD for the Special Zone Headquarters Company. Progress in providing personnel for the company since the authorization has been slow but the manning level is improving. A more significant problem in Quang Da is the shortage of RVN troops. The JGS has agreed that an additional regiment (or Vietnamese Marine Brigade) is necessary, however, troop requirements for operations in Cambodia have had greater priority than Quang Da and the assignment of the brigade has been delayed. This problem is now compounded by the CINC conversion plan which includes the 1st Ranger Group in the new Border Defense Command. The I Corps plan has been to collocate the Ranger Group and the new regiment.

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when it arrives, with the 1st and 7th US Marine Regiments. This assignment would provide them a period of tutelage with the Marine Regiments in the same manner that has worked so well between the 101st and the 1st ARVN Division and the Americal and the 2nd ARVN Division. Since the CIDG conversion has just started, it is not yet possible to assess the extent to which the Rangers' participation in the Border Defense Command will limit their employment within a specific area of operations in Quang Da Special Zone. It is evident, however, that the complete Ranger Group will not be continuously available for operations in this very critical area and that additional forces, beyond the projected new regiment, may be required.

(S) 10. COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS -

a. Artillery. The quality of ARVN artillery units in I CTZ is outstanding. I consider this to be one of the most remarkable and encouraging examples of success in the Improvement and Modernization Program. We have been able to withdraw advisors from artillery battalions in I Corps except for those with the newly activated units during the training phase and for a brief period following their initial deployment. The adequacy of artillery units in I CTZ is considered under paragraph 11.

b. Tactical Air. The quality of VNAF tactical air is excellent. During May 1970 VNAF began to conduct TACAIR strikes in support of US ground forces. These missions are not pre-planned but respond to "immediate" requests when VNAF aircraft are already in the vicinity of the target. Quantitatively, VNAF produces approximately 30 out of each 150 strike sorties flown each day in support of I Corps. The A-37 aircraft is still considered by USAF advisors to be very appropriate for Vietnamese needs.

c. Helicopters. One of the two squadrons of VNAF helicopters in I CTZ is dedicated to MACSOG (Vietnamese Special Forces) and only indirectly supports I Corps. The performance of the other squadron, the 213th, has been disappointing. Currently only 6 or 7 of the 31 aircraft assigned are available on an average day. This is characteristic of the 213th Squadron's performance since its activation 1 October 1969. The underlying causes of the squadron's failure appear to be poor management of available trained personnel and a general lack of a sense of urgency.

(S) 11. ADEQUACY OF FORCES - In evaluating the capability of ARVN units to take over the combat mission in I CTZ, I am considering the period when US ground combat forces have been withdrawn from active operations and are committed primarily to providing security for US combat and combat service support elements remaining in the residual force. The present enemy threat, at what is believed to be the peak of the current NVA summer buildup, is used as a measure. If the denial of the Cambodian sanctuaries should cause the NVA to shift the weight of their efforts into I Corps from the sanctuaries remaining in Laos and from across the DMZ, it is assumed there could be a corresponding shift of RVNAF forces from the southern CTZs to the I Corps area. Two other assumptions are made:

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a. The level of combat support now provided ARVN will remain substantially unchanged although the ratio of such support provided by RVNAF elements will increase as new units are activated and similar US supporting units are withdrawn.

b. The territorial forces will be able to provide basic security for the populated lowlands so that ARVN units can be targeted primarily against the NVA regiments along the DMZ and in the western piedmont and mountain areas. This is believed to be a reasonable assumption based on the present good performance of the territorial forces and their programmed increase in strength to approximately 70,000 by the end of 1970.

At present, the number of NVA maneuver battalions exceeds the ARVN maneuver battalions in I CTZ. (48 NVA versus 40 ARVN) However, considering the reduced strength of the NVA battalions, especially those operating at a distance from the DMZ or the Lantian frontier, the number of troops in the ARVN battalions is somewhat greater than the NVA strength.

Comparing the relative combat power of the two forces, ARVN has many decided advantages which tips the balance decidedly in their favor. These are:

Tube Artillery	Armor
B-52 Strikes (US)	Greater Mobility
Naval Gunfire (US)	Better Logistic Support
Tactical Air (VNAF and US)	

If the NVA were to employ major forces in the coastal plains the relative combat power of ARVN would exceed that of NVA units of similar strength at a ratio of perhaps 3 to 1. However, when ARVN units are forced to meet the NVA in the remote, heavily forested mountain areas in the west, the relative combat power of ARVN is considerably diminished.

Another factor in determining the number of maneuver units required is the length of the corps tactical zone--about 271 kilometers from the DMZ to the southern Quang Ngai border. In some areas this sets the lower limit of the number of maneuver units needed to provide an adequate screen between the NVA units in the mountains and the populated coastal plains.

In the 1st Division area the 10 maneuver battalions are believed to be sufficient to provide a screen for the lowlands against the number of NVA regiments which customarily remain in the western mountain areas in the winter monsoon period, but this number is inadequate to cope with a major concentration such as the present buildup to ten NVA regiments in Quang Tri and Thua Thien. To compensate for the withdrawal of US forces from the northern two provinces, it is estimated that an additional ARVN standard division of 12 battalions would be required for permanent assignment

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in this area to guard against the rapid reinforcing capability of the NVA. During the summer dry season one more reinforcing brigade will be required to strengthen offensive operations into the western mountains necessary to prevent the enemy from edging troops and supplies forward to the piedmont in striking distance of the populated lowlands. These reinforcing units would have to come from forces outside of the I CTZ.

In the 2nd Division area, if pacification in the plains continues at the present rate, it is believed that the 13 maneuver battalions of this division will be adequate to cope with NVA forces in the southern two provinces.

In the Quang Da Special Zone, the four infantry battalions, one armored squadron and three (or possibly less) Ranger battalions will not be sufficient to provide an adequate troop density in this critical area after the withdrawal of US units. As previously stated, the Vietnamese JGS recognized this shortfall and agreed earlier this year to deploy an additional regiment to this area. This deployment was postponed as a consequence of the operations in Cambodia.

There are now eight 105mm and four 155mm ARVN artillery battalions in I Corps. This is sufficient to provide one 105mm battalion in support of each of the eight infantry regiments. There are two 155mm battalions in the 1st Division area; one in QDSZ and one with the 2nd Division. This is believed to be adequate light and medium artillery to support the present maneuver battalions. An additional light artillery battalion will be required for the new regiment scheduled for deployment to QDSZ and the equivalent of seven more batteries will be needed to provide adequate fire support for the territorial forces. It is understood that 21 platoons of 105mm artillery have been approved for the territorial force mission in the next phase of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program. We had recommended that these platoons be activated and deployed as organic elements of ARVN artillery battalions rather than by separate platoons in order to provide the necessary command and control, logistic support and maintenance backup. This was not accented because of a shortage of authorized spaces. The additional division and brigade recommended above to reinforce the 1st Division area would, of course, require their normal supporting artillery.

I Corps will also require two heavy artillery battalions in the 1st Division area to reach into the western areas of Quang Tri and Thua Thien Provinces as well as to prevent the possibility of being outranged by enemy artillery beyond the DMZ. It is understood that two heavy battalions have been recommended in a future phase of the Improvement and Modernization Program.

At present there is only one VNAF tactical air squadron with nineteen A-37 aircraft in I CTZ. A second squadron of eighteen A-1 aircraft is to become operational in March 1972. Based on current usage rates, two more squadrons will be required to maintain the present level of tactical air support for ARVN units after the withdrawal of US forces from combat operations. This shortcoming would have to be met with continued US tactical air support

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until additional VNAF squadrons can be activated and trained in a later phase in the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program.

The 213th VNAF Helicopter Squadron became operational in October 1969. At the present time the unit is equipped with 31 HH-1H helicopters. Two are command and control aircraft and 29 are configured as "slicks". Eight of these are to be converted to gunships in the immediate future. As previously stated, the 213th Squadron has only been able to provide an average of 6 to 7 "slicks" in support of I Corps on a daily basis. The USAF advisor estimates this rate will increase by 1 July 1970 to a daily average of ten slicks. Four gunships and one command and control aircraft will also be provided daily when additional crews have been assigned and the guns have been installed.

A second light helicopter squadron is to be activated in early 1971. These two squadrons will not be sufficient to meet predicted ARVN requirements after US ground troops withdraw. A third squadron would provide the minimum daily helicopter requirements under current conditions.

I Corps will have a continuing requirement for a squadron of medium helicopters (16 CH-47 aircraft) in order to provide logistic support for units operating in the western mountains inaccessible by road as well as to displace artillery to fire support bases in these areas. It is understood that two medium companies will be included in the next phase of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program but that only eight of these will be made available to the support of I Corps.

Additional means and supporting assets which I Corps will require to maintain the current level of combat operations and to counter the NVA capability of massing multi-regimental forces against a specific area are listed below and considered in the paragraphs that follow:

Ground and air reconnaissance means to provide early warning.

B-52 strikes and naval gunfire to supplement artillery and tactical air to prevent the enemy from concentrating.

A capability for rapid movement of reinforcing units to threatened areas.

I Corps is already capable of performing the normal ground reconnaissance mission utilizing the reconnaissance elements organic to the divisions and regiments. With some additional training these units can also perform the long range reconnaissance mission.

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ARVN C-2 personnel can and do request air reconnaissance missions of all types but must rely on US resources to perform most of these missions. ARVN has the capability to perform visual reconnaissance with light aircraft and some basic photography. There are no units programmed at present to provide them the capability for sophisticated air reconnaissance such as infrared and side looking radar.

An additional early warning asset already available to ARVN is the sensor. The employment of sensors in I Corps units was covered in paragraph 6a.

ARVN, of course, won't have a heavy bomber capability but they are now fully capable of planning and requesting B-52 strikes. Ten of 56 targets struck by B-52's in this CTZ in the month of May were nominated by ARVN.

ARVN units already make good use of US naval gunfire especially in the coastal plains and along the DMZ. We know of no plans at present to add a gunfire capability to the Vietnamese Navy.

There is adequate truck transportation organic to the divisions and in the I Corps Area Logistic Command to move reinforcing units as required and, in this CTZ, the main highway (OL 1) is a good all-weather road throughout its entire length. In addition, US and ARVN engineers are completing a series of good lateral roads leading west from OL 1 into the major fire support bases along the piedmont.


In summary, I believe that the I Corps, with some additional infantry units, will be able to take over the combat mission in its area concomitant with a gradual withdrawal of US tactical forces. Some new combat support units, in addition to those authorized in the Phase II of the RVNAF Improvement and Modernization Program will be necessary to make them reasonably self-sufficient. US support will be required for heavy artillery, helolift and tacair until the additional ARVN units are operational. The requirement for US support with B-52 strikes, naval gunfire and electronic air reconnaissance will continue for an indefinite period.

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
HENRY J. MILLER, JR.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

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INCLOSURE 3

MAJOR UNIT STRENGTHS

AS OF 15 MAY

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASGD</u>	<u>Σ</u>
1st Inf Division	18,663	16,840	90
2nd Inf Division	13,879	11,717	84
1st Armored Bde	1,523	1,538	100
51st Inf Regiment	3,631	3,302	90
1st Ranger Group	2,089	1,922	92
I Corps Spt Units	<u>10,165</u>	<u>9,463</u>	<u>93</u>
TOTALS	49,950	44,782	89

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Unit Survey (L&AF)

The following is a unit survey. It is designed to be completed by the appropriate ARVN Staff Officer, assisted by the Regimental Senior Advisor as required. The answers are designed to provide statistical data which, when combined with the results of the individual surveys (Incl 3), it is hoped will provide information upon which to base recommendations ultimately to benefit the soldier and his family.

Unit preparing survey: \_\_\_\_\_ Date Completed: \_\_\_\_\_

Survey prepared by--(ARVN Staff Officer): \_\_\_\_\_  
(Name, Rank and Staff position)

--(Regtl Sen Advisor): \_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)

1. How many unit personnel have wives, children, or other dependents?

Off \_\_\_\_\_, NCO's \_\_\_\_\_, Privates \_\_\_\_\_.

2. Of the dependent children how many are -

a. Under 18 months of age \_\_\_\_\_.

b. Over 18 months but under 5 years old \_\_\_\_\_.

c. Over 5 years old \_\_\_\_\_.

3. The number of military personnel whose families live in the vicinity of the unit (battalion or regiment) -

Off \_\_\_\_\_, NCO's \_\_\_\_\_, Privates \_\_\_\_\_.

What is the total number of dependents involved? \_\_\_\_\_

4. The number of military personnel whose dependents live outside of the unit area and seldom (less than once each month) see their families -

Off \_\_\_\_\_, NCO's \_\_\_\_\_, Privates \_\_\_\_\_.

What is the total number of dependents involved? \_\_\_\_\_

For those whose dependents live outside the area, how often does the soldier get to see his family?

Monthly \_\_\_\_\_ Every Six Months \_\_\_\_\_

5. How many completed homes did your unit have as of 1 May 1970?

By Govt Contract \_\_\_\_\_ By Self Help \_\_\_\_\_

6. How many homes were under construction on 1 May 1970?

By Govt Contract \_\_\_\_\_ By Self Help \_\_\_\_\_

7. How many more homes are required for the dependents of your unit? (List how many homes need to be constructed and name the location, area or city at which the housing is required. Also show whether it is for Officer, NCO, or Private housing.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Number of homes, Off, NCO, Pvt)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Housing area or location)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Number of homes, Off, NCO, Pvt)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Housing area or location)

Incl-2



(Number of homes, Off, NCO, Pvt)

(Housing area or location)

(Number of homes, Off, NCO, Pvt)

(Housing area or location)

(Number of homes, Off, NCO, Pvt)

(Housing area or location)

8. Are adequate dependent schools available for the children?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ If not, what is being done?

What needs to be done?

9. What is Unit Leave Policy?

10. Are personnel properly briefed on procedures for obtaining transportation prior to reporting for leave? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

11. Is the mail system adequate in your area? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

If not, what can be done to improve it?

12. How does the soldier get his pay to his family?

13. Do promotion orders come from higher headquarters on time?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ If not, give some examples and any recommendations to improve the situation.

14. Does the unit place emphasis on special battlefield and meritorious promotion? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

15. Does your unit receive a fair share of battlefield promotions? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

16. Do awards get processed in a reasonable time? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
If not, cite some examples:

How many awards has the Regiment received since 1 January 1970?

AFVN - Cross of Gallantry, Gold Star \_\_\_\_\_ Silver Star \_\_\_\_\_  
Bronze Star \_\_\_\_\_ Wound Medal \_\_\_\_\_

US - Bronze Star \_\_\_\_\_ Bronze Star with Valor \_\_\_\_\_  
ARCOM \_\_\_\_\_ ARCOM with Valor \_\_\_\_\_

17. Is the Commissary Store adequate to support your unit? Yes \_\_\_\_\_  
No \_\_\_\_\_

~~Enc-4~~ Unit Survey

If not, what do you recommend to improve the service?

a. How many of the dependents keep the ration card? \_\_\_\_

b. If the soldier keeps the ration card, does he deliver the food to his family or do they come to get it and how is it done?

18. What are the unit's greatest clothing and equipment problems or shortages having an adverse impact on troop morale?

19. Does the unit have an established and effective Desertion Control Committee? Yes \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_ If not, what steps are being taken to establish the committee?

20. What special assistance is required from higher headquarters (in any field - admin, logistics, operations, etc.)?

21. What provisions are made by the unit on behalf of the widows and orphans of former service members?

22. Is the Regimental Dispensary adequate? Yes \_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_  
If not, what is needed to improve it?

23. List the recreational facilities available for the soldiers when they return from field operations? Or indicate what else is required. (Refer to area and list the facilities available or under construction at each site.)

24. Why do the personnel of your unit desert? Please be as concise as possible?

25. Do any of those who desert return of their own free will? Yes \_\_\_\_  
No \_\_\_\_  
If so, how many?  
If so, how long were they gone on an average?

Inc-2- Unit Survey

26. Is there a correlation between the time of a high desertion rate and the rice harvest, rice planting, or other economic activity with which your unit or your personnel may be involved? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
Please explain.

27. Assume that a solution is possible, please prepare at least five suggestions or recommendations (or list problem areas - you may include those cited above) the adoption (or correction) of which you believe would materially and favorably enhance the morale and welfare of the soldier. List in priority, if possible.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

Incl 2 ~~this Survey~~

Individual Survey (MEAP)

The following is an individual survey. You are to complete it as accurately and objectively as you can. Give the best answer you can prepare. If you are in doubt or don't know how to answer the question, merely leave it blank. The answers you provide will be studied in order to identify areas in which your commanders at each level can be of assistance to you. Please complete these forms and return them as soon as possible to your commanding officer. You may discuss the items on these forms with your friends but you are encouraged to write down your own ideas. In answering the questions make a mark (X) in the appropriate space or write your answer. You should show the date of the survey and the regiment or separate unit to which you are now assigned. You are not required to sign the form.

Unit (Regiment) to which assigned: \_\_\_\_\_

Date of completion of survey: \_\_\_\_\_

1. Do you consider that your morale is  
High \_\_\_\_\_ Low \_\_\_\_\_ Average \_\_\_\_\_
2. How long have you been in the Army? \_\_\_\_\_  
(Years or months)
3. How long have you been in the present Battalion \_\_\_\_\_ Regiment \_\_\_\_\_?
4. What is your military skill (MOS)? \_\_\_\_\_
5. Would you prefer to be trained in a different military skill?  
Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ If yes, which skill (MOS)? \_\_\_\_\_
6. What is your present rank? \_\_\_\_\_
  - a. How long have you been in grade? \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. What is your present duty? \_\_\_\_\_
7. What military school have you been to? (Show approximate date and length of school)
8. Are you married? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
9. How many dependents have you?
  - a. Under 18 months of age \_\_\_\_\_.
  - b. Over 18 months but less than 5 years old \_\_\_\_\_.
  - c. Over 5 years old but less than 15 years old \_\_\_\_\_.
  - d. Over 15 years old \_\_\_\_\_.
10. Do your wife and children live near you? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_
  - a. How often do you see your family?  
Daily \_\_\_\_\_ Weekly \_\_\_\_\_ Monthly \_\_\_\_\_
  - b. How far away do they live?  
Less than 20 km Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
More than 20 but less than 100 km Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

More than 100 km? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

11. Does your family live in government quarters? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

12. Do you own your own house? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

13. Do you live with your relatives? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

14. How much rent do you pay each month?

15. Is there a dependent school available for your children? Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_. Is it a Religious School \_\_\_\_\_ Private \_\_\_\_\_ Public \_\_\_\_\_

a. How many children attend the school? \_\_\_\_\_

b. What is the name and location of the school?

c. How much does it cost you each month to send your children to school?

d. Is the school adequate? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_ If not adequate, what is needed to improve it?

16. What is your faith or religion?

Buddhist \_\_\_\_\_ Confucianist \_\_\_\_\_ Catholic \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

17. Have you seen the Priest or Chaplain at your unit? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

18. Is the Regimental Commissary adequate? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

a. How often do you or your wife go to the commissary?

once each week \_\_\_\_\_ more than once each week \_\_\_\_\_

once each month \_\_\_\_\_ more than once each month \_\_\_\_\_

b. What food items do you buy at the commissary?

c. What items are not supplied that you believe should be supplied?

d. Do you save money by buying at the commissary? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

19. Are you receiving your pay regularly? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

If not, what is the apparent reason?

20. When were you last promoted?

When promoted, how long did it take for you to receive the increase in pay?

21. How do you send or deliver your money to your family?

22. How often do you go on pass or leave?
23. When is the last time you had annual leave?
24. What items of clothing or equipment are normally hard for you to get?

25. Where do your dependents receive their medical care?

Unit Dispensary \_\_\_\_\_  
(List name of unit or location)

Local Hospital \_\_\_\_\_  
(Show name of Hospital)

26. Have you ever received unit punishment? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_  
If so, list the offense committed and the type and amount of punishment given.

27. Have you been to the regimental dispensary? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

28. Have you been wounded in action? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

If so, were you evacuated to a hospital? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

How long were you hospitalized?

Less than 3 months \_\_\_\_\_  
More than 3 months but less than one year \_\_\_\_\_  
More than one year \_\_\_\_\_

While in the hospital did you receive your pay and allowances? Yes \_\_\_\_\_  
No \_\_\_\_\_

If not, how did you take care of your family?

29. What do you need most (if anything) to improve your self-confidence and ability to fight the enemy?

30. Why do you believe some soldiers are willing or attempt to desert?  
Please write down the main reason that you may have heard.

31. Have you ever made a suggestion to your superiors to improve your unit, your housing, or other matter related to your own well being or the improvement of your unit? Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

If yes, what was the main suggestion?

32. Are you familiar with the ARVN Information Program? Yes ☐ No ☐

Which impresses you most? TV ☐ Radio ☐ Printed Matter ☐

33. Do you or your family have a garden, raise chickens, etc.? Yes ☐  
No ☐

Would you be willing to help others to raise a garden, or raise or p  
in order to share in the results? Yes ☐ No ☐

34. Do you participate in any civic action project? Yes ☐ No ☐  
If yes, please describe it briefly.

35. What is your goal for the future?

36. Assume that you were in a position to accomplish them, please pre-  
pare 5 recommendations or suggestions that you believe would improve the  
morale and welfare of the soldier. (These may include the ideas you  
already mentioned above.) List them by priority, if possible.

a.

b.

c.

d.

e.

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